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Abstract. In abstract argumentation theory, multiple argumentation se-
mantics have been proposed that allow to select sets of jointly accept-
able arguments from a given set of arguments based on the attack re-
lation between arguments. The existence of multiple argumentation se-
mantics raises the question which of these semantics predicts best how
humans evaluate arguments, possibly depending on the thematic con-
text of the arguments. In this study we report on an empirical cognitive
study in which we tested how humans evaluate sets of arguments de-
pending on the abstract structure of the attack relation between them.
Two pilot studies were performed to validate the intended link between
argumentation frameworks and sets of natural language arguments. The
main experiment involved a group deliberation phase and made use of
three diﬀerent thematic contexts of the argument sets involved. The
data strongly suggest that independently of the thematic contexts that
we have considered, strong acceptance and strong rejection according
to the CF2 and preferred semantics are a better predictor for human
argument acceptance than the grounded semantics (which is identical to
strong acceptance/rejection with respect to complete semantics). Fur-
thermore, the data suggest that CF2 semantics predicts human argu-
ment acceptance better than preferred semantics, but the data for this
comparison is limited to a single thematic context.
Keywords. abstract argumentation, argumentation semantics, empirical
cognitive study
Introduction
In the context of abstract argumentation theory as introduced by [11], multiple
argumentation semantics have been proposed in the literature as criteria for se-
lecting acceptable arguments based on the structure of the attack relation be-
tween the arguments (see [4]). While most of the proposed semantics agree in
some simple cases, e.g. in the case of the simple reinstatement argumentation
framework depicted in Figure 1 on page 4, the diﬀerent semantics disagree on the
acceptability of arguments in more complex cases.
Given that the applicability of abstract argumentation theory to human rea-
soning is desirable, this situation gives rise to the following three research ques-
tions: First, in those cases in which all the standard argumentation semantics
agree, do humans actually evaluate the acceptability of arguments as predicted
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by these argumentation semantics? Second, in those cases in which there is dis-
agreement between the standard argumentation semantics, which one of them
best predicts the judgments that humans make about the arguments? Third, does
the answer to these questions depend on the thematic context of the arguments,
or is it largely context-independent?
Previous studies on cognitive aspects of abstract argumentation theory have
made some limited progress on these research questions, especially the study by
Rahwan et al. [19]. In this paper, we present the results of an empirical cognitive
study which was designed to overcome some of the limitations of their study so as
to make progress on all three research questions described above. The experiment
involved three diﬀerent thematic contexts of the argument sets involved. One im-
portant feature of our study is that we did not take for granted any assumptions
about the directionality of attacks between natural language arguments, but per-
formed two pilot studies to test the perceived directionality of attacks. Another
important feature of our study is that it involved a group deliberation phase,
which has been shown to increase performance in logical reasoning tasks [13,2].
Many standard semantics allow for multiple conﬂicting extensions or la-
bellings, which represent diﬀerent internally consistent judgments about the ar-
guments. In our experiment, however, participants were asked to make a single
judgment about each argument, so we compare their judgments to the justiﬁca-
tion status of arguments according to various semantics (see [24,4]), as the justiﬁ-
cation status is always unique. In particular, we focus on the justiﬁcation statuses
strong accept and strong reject, which in the labeling approach to argumentation
semantics correspond to always being labeled in or always being labeled out,
respectively. The justiﬁcation status in complete semantics directly corresponds
to grounded semantics, so we do not consider complete semantics separately.
The data from our experiment strongly suggest that independently of the
thematic contexts that we have considered, strong acceptance and strong rejection
according to the CF2 and preferred semantics are a better predictor for human
argument acceptance than the grounded semantics. Furthermore, the data suggest
that CF2 semantics predicts human argument acceptance better than preferred
semantics, but the data for this comparison is limited to a single thematic context.
1. Preliminaries of Abstract Argumentation Theory
We will assume that the reader is familiar with the basics of abstract argumenta-
tion theory as introduced by Dung [11] and as explained in its current state-of-the-
art form by Baroni et al. [4]. In particular, we will assume that the reader knows
the notion of an argumentation framework (AF) as well as the complete, grounded,
stable and preferred argumentation semantics as introduced by Dung [11], both
in their traditional extension-based variant and in their label-based variant [3,4].
In this section we furthermore deﬁne CF2 semantics as well as the notions of
strong acceptance and strong rejection, and we show how all these notions can
be applied to the three AFs that we will refer to in later sections. For reasons
that are explained at the end of this section, in this paper we focus on grounded,
preferred and CF2 semantics.
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CF2 semantics was ﬁrst introduced by Baroni et al. [5]. The idea behind it
is that we partition the AF into strongly connected components and recursively
evaluate it component by component by choosing maximal conﬂict-free sets in
each component and removing arguments attacked by chosen arguments. We for-
mally deﬁne it following the notation of Dvorˇa´k and Gaggl [12]. For this we ﬁrst
need some auxiliary notions:
Deﬁnition 1. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF. A set S ⊂ Ar of arguments is conﬂict-
free iﬀ there are no arguments b, c ∈ S such that b attacks c (i.e. such that
(b, c) ∈ att). F is called strongly connected if there is an att-path from each
argument in Ar to each other argument in Ar. A strongly connected component
(SCC) of F is a maximal strongly connected component of F . We denote the set
of SCCs of F by SCCs(F ). When a, b ∈ A are in the same SCC, we write a ∼ b.
Given S ⊆ A, we deﬁne DF (S) := {b ∈ A | ∃a ∈ S : (a, b) ∈ att ∧ a 
∼ b}.
We now recursively deﬁne CF2 extensions as follows:
Deﬁnition 2. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF, and let S ⊆ Ar. Then S is a CF2
extension of F iﬀ either
• |SCCs(F )| = 1 and S is a maximal conﬂict-free subset of A, or
• |SCCs(F )| > 1 and for each C ∈ SCCs(F ), S ∩ C is a CF2 extension of
F |C−DF (S).
While the grounded extension of an AF is always unique, an AF with cycles
may have multiple preferred extensions and multiple CF2 extensions. In our ex-
periment, however, participants were asked to make a single judgment about each
argument, so we compare their judgments to the justiﬁcation status of arguments
according to various semantics (see [24,4]), as the justiﬁcation status is always
unique for each argument. In particular, we focus on the justiﬁcation statuses
strong accept and strong reject, which can be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF, let σ be an argumentation semantics,
and let a ∈ A be an argument. We say that a is strongly accepted with respect to
σ iﬀ for every σ-extension E of F , a ∈ E. We say that a is strongly rejected with
respect to σ iﬀ for every σ-extension E of F , some b ∈ E attacks a.
Note that in the labeling approach, strong acceptance of a corresponds to a
being labeled in by all labelings, and strong rejection of a corresponds to a being
labeled out by all labelings. Note that in some AFs there are arguments that are
neither strongly accepted nor strongly rejected with respect to some semantics,
so based on these two notions we have actually deﬁned a three-valued partition
of the arguments of a given AF with respect to a given semantics.
Let us illustrate the deﬁned notion by considering how they apply to the
three AFs depicted in Figures 1, 2 and 3, which are also the AFs used in the
empirical cognitive study. In the case of the simple reinstatement AF in Figure 1,
arguments C and A are strongly accepted with respect to grounded, preferred and
CF2 semantics, and argument B is strongly rejected with respect to these three
semantics. In the case of the ﬂoating reinstatement framework in Figure 2, argu-
ment B is strongly rejected and argument A is strongly accepted with respect to
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preferred and CF2 semantics. Arguments C and D are neither strongly accepted
nor strongly rejected with respect to any of the three semantics under consider-
ation, and with respect to grounded semantics, the same holds for arguments A
and B. In the case of the 3-cycle reinstatement framework in Figure 3, none of the
ﬁve arguments is strongly accepted or strongly rejected with respect to grounded
or preferred semantics. With respect to CF2 semantics, on the other hand, B is
strongly rejected, A is strongly accepted, while the other three arguments are
neither strongly accepted nor strongly rejected.
We now brieﬂy explain why we focus on grounded, preferred and CF2 seman-
tics in this paper. Two other semantics widely considered in the literature are the
complete semantics and the stable semantics. The justiﬁcation status in the com-
plete semantics is the same as in the grounded semantics, so we do not consider
complete semantics separately. The stable semantics has the serious disadvantage
that for some AFs, there is no stable extension, so the justiﬁcation statuses that
we deﬁned cannot be meaningfully applied to such frameworks.
CF2 semantics belongs to a family of semantics called naive-based semantics,
to which one also counts naive semantics, stage semantics and stage2 semantics
(see [21]). Naive semantics ignores the directionality of attacks, a central fea-
ture that distinguishes argumentation theory from classical logic. Furthermore,
no arguments ever get strongly rejected with respect to naive semantics, and
only unattacked arguments get strongly accepted, so it strongly deviates from
other argumentation semantics. For these reasons, whenever we make statements
about “standard argumentation semantics”, we consider naive semantics to be
excluded from this set. Stage and stage2 semantics on the other hand are much
more well-behaved and should in principle be considered as potential predictors
of human argumentative reasoning. The only reason why we leave them out of
the comparisons with the empirical data in Section 6 is that for the AFs used in
this study, they make the same predictions as CF2 semantics, so the data from
our experiment cannot distinguish between these three naive-based semantics.
2. Related Work
While formal argumentation theory is an important branch of research within
AI, only a few studies have empirically investigated the cognitive plausibility of
the formalisms from argumentation theory: The ﬁrst of its kind was the study of
Rahwan et al. [19], who tested how humans evaluate simple reinstatement and
ﬂoating reinstatement. Cerutti et al. [8] have tested the correspondence between
human evaluation of arguments and properties of a logic-programming-based ap-
proach to structured argumentation proposed by Prakken and Sartor [18]. Rosen-
feld and Kraus [20] have empirically studied human argumentative behavior and
compared it to bipolar AFs [7]. Polberg and Hunter [16] performed an experiment
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to investigate the relation between human reasoning on the one hand and bipolar
and probabilistic approaches to abstract argumentation on the other hand.
Of these four empirical studies, the one that comes closest in its aims to our
study is the study of Rahwan et al. [19]. Their paper includes a discussion of why
this kind of empirical validation of formalisms from argumentation theory is a
highly relevant method that complements the more widely applied example-based
and principle-based approaches. Being the ﬁrst study to investigate the cognitive
plausibility of the formalisms from argumentation theory, it laid the foundations
for further work in this area. But, as is normal for an empirical study that is
the ﬁrst to address certain research questions, it also had some limitations and
problematic features, as we explain in more detail for the rest of this section.
Their study only made use of two AFs, namely the simple reinstatement AF
in Figure 1 and the ﬂoating reinstatement AF in Figure 2. Since all standard se-
mantics agree on the evaluation of simple reinstatement, only the results on ﬂoat-
ing reinstatement could distinguish between diﬀerent semantics, so only limited
claims could be made about which semantics best predicts human judgments.
The authors did not empirically test their assumption that the natural lan-
guage argument sets that they designed actually correspond to the intended AFs.
This limitation is especially pressing in light of the fact that the attacks that they
intended to be unidirectional were based on conﬂicts between the conclusion of
the attacking argument and the premise of the attacked argument, without any
indication of a preference. In the frameworks of structured argumentation from
the ASPIC family [17,14,6], such underminings without preferences always give
rise to bidirectional attacks.
In their study, participants were asked to assess the conclusion of a designated
argument on a 7-point Likert scale from certainly false to certainly true. However,
it is diﬃcult to compare their 7-point Likert scale results to the predictions of
argumentation formalisms that are two- or three-valued.
We designed our study with the aim to overcome these issues that we had
identiﬁed in Rahwan et al.’s study, so as to make further progress based on the
important foundations that they had laid with their study.
3. Cognitive variability of humans
Given that this paper presents ﬁndings of a cognitive empirical study to an audi-
ence whose scientiﬁc expertise lies mainly in areas outside of cognitive science, we
present some general background from cognitive science that will help to make
our methodological choices and our discussion of the results more understandable.
Humans are heterogeneous by nature; they diﬀer from each other with respect
to their cognitive abilities [1]. Cronbach [10] claimed that human heterogeneity
is actually a major disturbance in the conduction of empirical studies. Cognitive
variability has thus been mostly considered as an undesirable random noise in
cognitive studies. This disturbance is even more problematic in the case of em-
pirical studies that evaluate complex cognitive processes such as logical thinking
and reasoning. Indeed, the inherent diﬃculty of such tasks not only emphasizes
human diﬀerences relative to pure cognitive abilities (such as intelligence), but
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also involves motivational aspects that are crucial to obtain a reliable performance
from the participant [23]. In order to test the cognitive plausibility of abstract ar-
gumentation theory by minimizing unwanted bias purely related to cognition and
motivation properties, we set up a methodology that favored rational thinking
during the assessment.
Previous results showed that individual performance, which has generally
been reported to be quite poor in pure logic and reasoning tasks, could actually
be enhanced by cooperative discussion with peers. For instance, faced with the
Wason selection task [22], humans solving the task in groups achieved a level of
insight that was qualitatively superior to the one achieved by single individuals
[13,2]. Additionally, and more generally, discussion with peers was proved to sub-
stantially improve motivation to solve a given task [15]. For these reasons, we
decided to incorporate in our methodology a cooperative discussion to help par-
ticipants to elaborate and enrich their thinking. This collective step with peers
was designed to obtain an evaluation of the justiﬁcation status more reliable than
a single individual judgment. Such reliability is crucial to test the cognitive plau-
sibility of our predictions.
4. Pilot studies
We conducted two pilot studies to verify our predictions about the existence and
the directionality of attacks between natural language arguments. Both pilot stud-
ies involved the argument sets from Rahwan et al.’s [19] study, and new argument
sets with a large variety of attack types that we speciﬁcally designed. All partici-
pants were individually assessed. In the ﬁrst study, 27 undergraduate students of
various backgrounds were shown two arguments at a time and were instructed to
judge the acceptability of each argument (accept, undecided or reject). We used
their judgments to infer their representation of the directionality of the attacks
between the arguments. In the second study, 14 active researchers, who are ex-
pert in formal argumentation theory, had to directly judge the existence and the
directionality of every attack between all arguments within each set.
Results from both pilot studies consistently showed that participants were
overall able to judge the existence and directionality of a conﬂict between two
given arguments. More particularly, the items that we designed for the pilot study
led to high agreement with the theoretically assumed attack relations (74% and
84% consistent response, respectively in students and experts). On the other
hand, it should be noted that attacks and non-attacks between arguments from
Rahwan et al.’s [19] study were identiﬁed as intended in only 56% and 73% of the
cases (in students and experts). Especially noteworthy is the fact that the attacks
that Rahwan et al. intended to be unidirectional were identiﬁed as such by only
17% of students and 44% of experts; most participants considered them to be
bidirectional rather than unidirectional attacks. The results of the pilot studies
are described and discussed in more detail in a separate workshop paper [9].
For the purpose of using them in the main study, we selected four argument
sets in which the agreement between the judgments of pilot study participants and
the AF intended by us was especially high. The chosen arguments were judged
as intended in 77% and 87% of the cases (by students and experts).
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5. Design of main study
We tested 130 undergraduate students from the University of Luxembourg (mean
age = 22 years). Each participant was presented with a set of 3 to 5 natural lan-
guage arguments, which was designed to correspond to the simple reinstatement,
ﬂoating reinstatement or 3-cycle reinstatement AF, as depicted in Figures 1, 2
and 3 in Section 1. As explained in Section 4 above, this correspondence between
the argument sets chosen for the main study and the corresponding AFs had
been conﬁrmed by two pilot studies. The questionnaire consisted of two successive
parts, the ﬁrst of which involved drawing the attack relation between the given
arguments and the second of which involved judging the acceptability of each
argument in light of the information provided in all arguments. In this paper we
focus our attention to the second part of the questionnaire.
The study involved arguments based on three diﬀerent thematic contexts:
arguments based on news reports, arguments based on scientiﬁc publications, and
arguments based on the precision of a calculation tool (referred to as mathemat-
ical context). The full set of argument sets employed in the study is available at
http://icr.uni.lu/mcramer/downloads/Argument Sets COMMA 2018.pdf. As
an example, here is the argument set of the scientiﬁc context corresponding to
ﬂoating reinstatement:
A. Specimen A consists only of amylase. The 1972 Encyclopaedia of Biochemistry
states that amylase is an enzyme. So specimen A consists of an enzyme.
B. A peer-reviewed research article by Smith et al. from 2006 presented new ﬁnd-
ings that amylase is not an enzyme. Therefore no specimen consisting only of
amylase consists of an enzyme.
C. A study that the Biology Laboratory of Harvard University has published in
2011 corrects mistakes made in the study by Smith et al. and concludes that
amylase is a biologically active enzyme.
D. A study that the Biochemistry Laboratory of Oxford University has published
in 2011 corrects mistakes made in the study by Smith et al. and concludes that
amylase is a biologically inactive enzyme.
For every argument set {A, B, C, D} representing ﬂoating reinstatement, we used
the subset {A, B, C} as an argument set representing simple reinstatement, so
the data on simple reinstatement and ﬂoating reinstatement can be directly com-
pared. Due to the particular structure of the 3-cycle reinstatement AF, we used a
slightly diﬀerent set of arguments for this case. Due to the diﬃculty of adequately
designing an argument set of this complexity and verifying its correspondence to
the 3-cycle reinstatement AF through pilot studies, we could only include a single
argument set corresponding to the 3-cycle reinstatement AF in this study, which
was of scientiﬁc context.
Participants answered the questionnaire in groups of 3 to 5 students (as a
function of the number of arguments they were shown). Each argument set was
used for 5 groups. Thus 45 participants responded to the simple reinstatement
argument sets, 60 participants to the ﬂoating reinstatement argument set, and 25
participants to the 3-cycle reinstatement argument set.
The participants were asked to judge the acceptability of each argument from
the argument set by indicating either that they accept the argument, that they
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Figure 4. Results of our study disregarding the thematic context. For each each argument of
each of the three AFs, the ﬁgure indicates the percentage of cases in which participants chose
to accept a corresponding natural language argument, to reject it or to consider it undecided.
reject it, or that they consider it undecided. They were instructed to accept an
argument unless the other arguments provide reasons to reject it. Importantly,
as explained in Section 3, our methodology incorporated a group discussion to
stimulate more rational thinking: In a ﬁrst step, each participant had to provide
a personal judgment of the acceptability of each argument. In a second step, the
group members had to discuss their initial response with each other and had to
reach a consensus in order to provide one response as a group (or as a function
of the simple majority if no consensus was reached). Finally, in a third step,
participants had the opportunity to follow or not to follow the group decision by
giving their ﬁnal individual response. In our presentation and discussion of the
results, we only consider the results of the ﬁnal individual responses.
6. Results of main study and discussion
In Figure 4, the overall results of our study are depicted, disregarding the thematic
context. For simple reinstatement, a large majority of participants accepted A
and C, and rejected B. A Pearson chi-squared conﬁrmed that this distribution of
the response for each argument was not due to chance, minimal χ2(2) = 12.93,
p < .001. In sets with ﬂoating reinstatement, participants signiﬁcantly tended to
accept A, reject B, and consider C and D as undecided, minimal χ2(2) = 55.60,
p < .001. Finally, for 3-cycle reinstatement, the majority of participants accepted
A and rejected B while considering every other argument as undecided; their
judgments reached the signiﬁcance level, minimal χ2(2) = 7.28, p = .026.
The majority judgment about the three arguments in simple reinstatement
coincides with the predictions of all standard semantics. Given that reinstatement
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is one of the most fundamental features of Dung-style abstract argumentation the-
ory, this ﬁnding speaks in favor of the cognitive plausibility of Dung-style abstract
argumentation theory. Furthermore, our data is supportive of a positive answer
to the ﬁrst research question described in the Introduction, namely that in those
cases in which all the standard argumentation semantics agree, humans evaluate
the acceptability of arguments as predicted by these argumentation semantics.
Of course, further AFs on which all semantics agree will have to be considered
in future studies in order to test whether this really holds in this generality, or
whether it only holds in limited cases.
The tendencies that we have observed above for the data that aggregates
all three contexts also hold in the case of each of the three contexts considered
separately, in the sense that for each argument, the response predicted by all
semantics was chosen by the absolute majority (> 50%) of participants, with only
one exception: For argument A in the news report context, the predicted answer,
accept, was only chosen by 40% of the agents, while 40% rejected it and 20%
considered it undecided. There are two potential explanations of it: On the one
hand, using world knowledge, participants might have judged the main claim in
the argument (namely that Donald Trump shot a lion) to be very implausible,
thus favoring to reject the argument. Additionally the diﬀerence between the
contexts might be due to people trusting scientiﬁc publications and calculation
tools more than they trust news reports.
In the case of ﬂoating reinstatement and 3-cycle reinstatement, there are
discrepancies between the diﬀerent semantics concerning the justiﬁcation status
of the arguments. For this reason, our results can be used to support certain
answers to the second research question from the Introduction: In those cases in
which there is disagreement between the standard argumentation semantics, which
one of them best predicts the judgments that humans make about the arguments?
As explained in Section 1, we focus our attention to grounded, preferred and CF2
semantics. In order to tackle this research question, we compare the predictions
of these semantics pairwise by focusing on those arguments on which the two
compared semantics have diﬀerent justiﬁcation status.
The results of these pairwise comparisons are depicted in Figure 5, separated
by AF (ﬂoating reinstatement and 3-cycle reinstatement) and thematic context
(as explained in Section 5 our study is limited to a single thematic context in
the case of 3-cycle reinstatement). Note that the preferred and CF2 semantics
fully agree on ﬂoating reinstatement, while the grounded and preferred semantics
fully agree on 3-cycle reinstatement. The ﬁrst two bars indicate percentage of
correct predictions as a function of the two compared semantics. Since there are
three possible responses (accept, reject and undecided), there is also always the
possibility that none of the two compared semantics predicts the result correctly;
the third (red) bar indicates the percentage of responses that were predicted by
none of the semantics.
In ﬂoating reinstatement, the justiﬁcation status varies between grounded
semantics on the one hand and preferred and CF2 semantics on the other hand
only in case of arguments A and B, so we focus our attention on the responses
to these arguments. As can be seen on the left side of Figure 5, preferred/CF2
semantics correctly predicted the responses in 100% and in 97.5% of the cases
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Figure 5. Pairwise comparison of semantics, aggregating all arguments whose justiﬁcation status
varies between the compared semantics. Data is separated by AF and thematic context. (A), on
the left side, depicts predictions from the Floating reinstatement framework; (B), on the right
side, depicts predictions from the 3-cycle framework. Both parts of the ﬁgure indicate percentage
of cases in which participants responded as predicted by one of the compared semantics or by
none of them.
in scientiﬁc and mathematical context respectively, whereas grounded semantics
correctly predicted the responses to these arguments in 0% and 2.5% of the cases
in these two contexts. In the case of the news report context, there is a smaller dif-
ference between the semantics, but the higher accuracy of preferred/CF2 seman-
tics as compared to the grounded semantics is still signiﬁcant (67.5% vs. 27.5%,
binomial p < .001, one-sided). This diﬀerence between the contexts is similar to
the diﬀerence between contexts discussed for simple reinstatement above, and can
be explained in a similar way. So we consider it likely to be due to the inﬂuence
of world knowledge on the evaluation of individual arguments rather than due to
some people applying a diﬀerent argumentation semantics. At any rate, note that
even though the context had an inﬂuence on some people, the overall tendency
that most people responded more in line with preferred and CF2 semantics than
with grounded semantics holds irrespective of the context.
In 3-cycle reinstatement, we again focus on arguments A and B, as they
are the only ones on which the justiﬁcation status varies between grounded and
preferred semantics on the one hand and CF2 semantics on the other hand. As can
be seen on the right side of Figure 5, the predictions of grounded and preferred
semantics were only correct in 12% of the case, whereas CF2 correctly predicted
acceptance status in 56% of the cases. The diﬀerence between both semantics were
signiﬁcant (binomial p < .001, one-sided). Surprisingly, in 32% of the cases none
of the semantics predicted the judgment of participants. The only explanation
we have for this surprising ﬁnding is that in the 3-cycle reinstatement argument
set, argument A was based on trust in a statement from the “1962 Encyclopedia
of Chemistry”, whereas all other scientiﬁc publications cited in this argument
set were much more recent (2003 to 2008), so participants might have dismissed
argument A for being based on too old a scientiﬁc source.
Summarizing the results of our comparison between the diﬀerent semantics,
we can say that our data strongly suggest that independently of the three the-
matic contexts that we have considered, CF2 and preferred semantics are a better
predictor for human argument acceptance than the grounded semantics. Further-
more, the data suggest that CF2 semantics predict human argument acceptance
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better than preferred semantics, but the data for this comparison is limited to a
single thematic context and is less conclusive.
Note that our ﬁndings on simple reinstatement and ﬂoating reinstatement
can be seen as a conﬁrmation of the ﬁndings of Rahwan et al. [19] on human judg-
ments related to these two AFs. Even though the data is not directly compara-
ble, since their participants judged arguments on a 7-point Likert scale instead of
making the three-valued acceptability judgments that our participants were asked
to make, their ﬁnal interpretation of their data is similar to ours: The predictions
of standard semantics on simple reinstatement are in line with human judgments,
and in ﬂoating reinstatement, preferred semantics predicts human judgments bet-
ter than grounded semantics. We extend these ﬁndings with ﬁndings about 3-cycle
reinstatement which suggest that CF2 semantics is a better predictor for human
judgments than preferred semantics. But apart from this extension, there are also
important methodological diﬀerences between our studies: Unlike Rahwan et al.,
we performed pilot studies that conﬁrmed that the natural language argument
sets correspond to the intended AFs, and our pilot studies even suggest that the
attacks that Rahwan et al. intended to be unidirectional are treated by humans
as bidirectional, which calls into doubt their assumption that their ﬁndings are
about the simple and ﬂoating reinstatement AFs rather than about AFs involving
only bidirectional attacks. Furthermore, whereas in Rahwan et al.’s study partic-
ipants had to respond individually, the group deliberation methodology that we
have applied is known to enhance performance of humans in reasoning tasks.
7. Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper, we have presented and discussed the results of an empirical cognitive
study on the cognitive plausibility of abstract argumentation semantics. Two
pilot studies veriﬁed the intended link between argumentation frameworks and
sets of natural language arguments. The results of the main study suggest that
independently of the thematic contexts that we have considered, CF2 (or stage
or stage2) and preferred semantics are a better predictor for human argument
acceptance than the grounded semantics. Furthermore, the data suggest that CF2
semantics predicts human argument acceptance better than preferred semantics,
but the data for this comparison is limited to a single thematic context.
This study contributes to the still young and under-explored research ﬁeld of
cognitive aspects of formal argumentation theory. The limitations of the presented
study highlight potential further research in this ﬁeld: Future studies should be
based on a larger variety of AFs than the three AFs used in this study. Given
that our study suggests that naive-based semantics like CF2, stage and stage2
are good predictors of human judgments, special attention should be given to
AFs on which they have diﬀerent predictions, so as to ﬁnd out which one of them
predicts human judgments best. Furthermore, future studies should attempt to
minimize the inﬂuence of world knowledge on argument judgments, so as to get a
clearer idea of the inﬂuence of the logical form of arguments on human judgments.
One possible way in which this could be achieved is by using arguments that
are embedded in a ﬁctional setting about which the participants can have no
knowledge other than the one provided to them during the experiment.
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